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Environmental Law-Nationwide Permits for Categories of
Waters Issued by the Corps of Engineers Under FWPCA
Section 404: A Legitimate Administrative
Interpretation Ratified by Congress?
Wetlands-swamps, bogs, marshes, wet meadows, salt marshes, prairie
potholes, hardwood bottomland-are a valuable resource.' Salt marshes, for
example, comprise some of the most biologically productive ecosystems in the
world.2 Various types of wetlands are essential as habitat for many species of
fish and wildlife.3 In addition, wetlands provide direct benefits to human
populations, such as creating a buffer to flood waters.4 In the Charles River
basin near Boston, wetlands are estimated to reduce yearly flood damage by
approximately $17 million each year.5 Reports of the failure of manmade
flood control barriers to achieve similar results fill the newspapers each spring.
Wetlands are also excellent water purifiers; some communities have used wet-
lands as natural, and effective, sewage treatment facilities.6 Wetlands hold
water and allow it to seep slowly back into the land to recharge ground water
aquifers stressed by urban or irrigation use.7 They also prevent the erosion of
shorelines and filter the silt and sediment resulting from upland erosion and
mn-off.8
The recognized importance of wetlands, however, is not sufficient to pro-
tect them from destruction. Coastal developers and midland farmers view un-
derwater land as wasteland, and along with many others have been working
for decades to fill and convert to "productive use" these valuable ecosystems.
One million acres of coastal marsh have been lost since 1954.9 An estimated
forty to sixty-five percent of the original wetlands in the lower forty-eight
states have been destroyed.10 Californians have spared less than 450,000 acres
1. NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION, WETLANDS: A VALUABLE RESOURCE 1.
2. G. MILLER, LIVING IN THE ENVIRONMENT 198 (3d ed. 1982). The average net primary
productivity (measured in kcal/m 2 /yr) of estuarine systems, swamps, and marshes is about three
times that of agricultural land and about fifty percent higher than that of temperate forests. Id. at
72.
3. NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION, supra note 1, at 1.
4. This is not to say that the biological productivity of wetlands and the importance of
wetlands to fish and wildlife is not of importance to humans. The high biological concentrations
in marshes make them high producers of oxygen in a world with an atmosphere that is filling up
with carbon dioxide. Economically and gastronomically important species, such as shrimp and
blue crab, are dependent on wetlands during part of their life cycles. In fact, wetlands support
about two-thirds, by volume, of the commercial fish harvest along the eastern coast of the U.S.
This catch is worth billions of dollars. G. MILLER, supra note 2, at 198.
5. NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION, supra note 1, at 1.
6. For example, in Wildwood, Florida (pop. 2500) a 506 acre gum-cypress swamp removed
98% of the phosphorus and 90% of the nitrogen from the sewage, and reduced fecal coliform
bacteria from 16 million to 3 thousand per liter within two miles of the discharge. Id at 1-2. The
author reserves judgment as to the ecological wisdom of such use.
7. Id at 2.
8. Id.
9. NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION, WE ARE LOSING OUR WETLANDS I.
10. Id.; 123 CONG. REc. 26,717 (1977) (statement of Sen. Chafee), reprinted in 4 STAFF OF
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of their original 3.5 million acres of wetlands." Only 70,000 acres of Iowa's
natural 1,196,392 acres of wetlands have escaped "reclamation."'12 North Car-
olina currently retains only thirty-one percent of its pocosin wetlands. 13 The
destruction has not ended: an additional 300,000 acres of coastal and inland
wetlands continue to be lost or damaged each year.' 4
Congress has recognized the problem, addressing it preliminarily in 1972
when it added section 40415 to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
(FWPCA), 16 and addressing it more fully in the 1977 amendments. 17 In 1982,
however, the Army Corps of Engineers, which is responsible for implementing
section 404, promulgated nationwide regulations that allow holders of permits
to fill in wetlands (or undertake other dredge and fill activities) so long as the
wetlands are above the headwaters, are associated with isolated lakes, or are
isolated.' 8 Although these permits do not appear to be authorized by the stat-
ute, the Corps asserts that Congress ratified issuance of the permits when it
amended the FWPCA in 1977 without acting to declare the Corps' earlier na-
tionwide permits illegal. This note will examine the legality of these permits
and the question whether Congress in fact ratified them when it amended the
FWPCA.
Section 404 of the FWPCA provides that the Secretary of the Army "may
issue permits, after notice and opportunity for public hearings, for the dis-
charge of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters at specified dispo-
sal sites."' 9 Section 301 of the Act,20 also added in the comprehensive 1972
amendments, provides that "[e]xcept as in compliance with this section and
sections 1312, 1316, 1317, 1328, 1342, and 1344 [section 404 of the FWPCA
was codified as section 1344] of this title, the discharge of any pollutant by any
person shall be unlawful."' 21 Pollutant is defined in the Act to include-in
SENATE COMM. ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS, 95TH CONG., 2D SESs., A LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT OF 1977, at 918 (Comm. Print 1978) [hereinafter cited as
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1977 AT]. This loss, at least in coastal areas, is due primarily to dredging
and filling. G. MILLER, supra note 2, at 199.
11. NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION, supra note 9, at 1.
12. Id. at 2.
13. Id. Pocosins are coastal freshwater wetlands with underlying peat deposits. They are an
important habitat for black bear, deer, bobcat, otter, mink, muskrat, raccoon, and grey fox, among
other species, and also buffer the flow of fresh water into estuaries, assisting in the maintenance of
the saltwater balance necessary for juvenile members of species such as shrimp and flounder. Id.
14. G. MILLER, supra note 2, at 199.
15. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 404, 86
Stat. 816, 884 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (Supp. V 1981)).
16. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, ch. 758, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C.).
17. Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, § 67, 91 Stat. 1566, 1600-08 (codified at 33
U.S.C. § 1344 (Supp. V 1981)).
18. Interim Final Permit Program Rules, 47 Fed. Reg. 31,793-834 (1982) (to be codified at 33
C.F.R. §§ 320-330).
19. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (Supp. V 1981).
20. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 301, 86
Stat. 816, 844-46 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
21. 33 U.S.C. § 13 11(a) (1976). Section 1312 provides for establishment of effluent limita-
tions on point sources of pollution. Section 1316 provides for establishment of national standards
of performance for specific sources of pollutants. Section 1317 mandates establishment of effluent
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addition to sewage, chemical wastes, heat, and garbage-dredged spoil, rock,
sand, and cellar dirt.22 Sections 301 and 404 thus make it unlawful for a per-
son to discharge dredged or fill material (rock, sand, or dirt) into navigable
waters without a permit to do so issued under section 404. This type of dis-
charge occurs on perhaps its largest scale in wetlands, as landowners seek to
fill and reclaim swamps, marshes, and other wetlands.23 Thus, section 404
stands as the primary check in the federal statutory scheme on wetland loss.
Three particular aspects of section 404 are important as starting points.
First, the Army Corps of Engineers is responsible for administering section
404. 24 By contrast, the EPA is charged with executing the bulk of the Act.
Second, limitations imposed by principles of federalism and the commerce
clause restrict the applicability of section 404 to "navigable waters."'25 Third,
although the term "navigable waters" is statutorily defined simply as "waters
of the United States," 26 the Corps has tended to construe that term narrowly
in other statutory contexts.
Until recently, the Corps regulated wetlands only pursuant to the River
and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899.27 Sections 9,28 10,29 and 1130 of that
Act require permits for certain types of structures or work occurring in or af-
fecting navigable waters, including dredging and stream channelization, exca-
vation, and filling. Section 1331 of the 1899 Act prohibited the discharge of
refuse into navigable waters, but because the Act was enacted primarily to
protect navigation,32 the Corps administered the Act "only to protect naviga-
tion and the navigable capacity of the nation's waters."'33 In this connection,
the Corps established harbor lines landward of which permits were not re-
quired, and the permit requirements "were limited in their application to wa-
ters that were presently used as highways for the transportation of interstate or
limitations for toxic pollutants and of pretreatment standards for introduction of pollutants into
public treatment works. Section 1328 allows discharges of pollutants from aquacultural facilities,
Section 1342 establishes the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, the major system
for permitting the discharge of conventional pollutants. Id §§ 1312, 1316, 1317, 1328, 1342.
22. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (1976). "Dredged spoil" simply means material excavated or dredg-
ed from underwater. See 47 Fed. Reg. 31,811 (1982) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(i)). The
meaning of "cellar dirt," as opposed to ordinary dirt, is unclear.
23. Indeed, "fill material" is administratively defined as "any material used for the primary
purpose of replacing an aquatic area with dry land." 47 Fed. Reg. 31,811 (1982) (to be codified at
33 C.F.R. § 323.2(k)).
24. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (Supp. V 1981).
25. As stated in the congressional declaration of goals and policy, "it is the national goal that
the discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters be eliminated by 1985." Id § 1251(a)(1)
(1976) (emphasis added). Permits under § 404 may be issued only for discharges into navigable
waters. Id § 1344(a).
26. Id § 1362(7) (1976).
27. See 42 Fed. Reg. 37,122 (1977).
28. River and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, § 9, ch. 425, 30 Stat. 1121, 1151 (codified
at 33 U.S.C. § 401 (1976)).
29. Id § 10, ch. 425, 30 Stat. 1121, 1151 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1976)).
30. Id § 11, ch. 425, 30 Stat. 1121, 1151 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 404 (1976)).
31. Id § 13, ch. 425, 30 Stat. 1121, 1152 (codified at 33 U.S.C. §407 (1976)) (popularly
known as the Refuse Act of 1899).
32. See 42 Fed. Reg. 37,122 (1977).
33. Id
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foreign commerce."' 34 In 1968 the Corps expanded the scope of its review of
permit applications under the 1899 Act.35 The new review was "a public inter-
est review," and included a host of additional factors besides navigation. 36
In 1972, while the FWPCA was being considered in Congress, the Corps
perceived a "growing concern" in the federal government over water quality.3 7
In response to this concern, the Corps published on September 9, 1972 a new,
expanded administrative definition of "navigable waters. '38 In addition to
waters presently used to transport interstate or foreign commerce, the new def-
inition included: all waters used in the past for such transport, all waters sus-
ceptible to such use in their ordinary condition or by reasonable improvement,
and all waters subject to the ebb and flow of the tide.39 The Corps also broad-
ened the landward limits of its jurisdiction. For freshwater the limit was the
ordinary high water mark, and for tidal water the limit was the mean high
water mark.4°
Section 404, as part of the comprehensive 1972 amendments, was added
to the FWPCA on October 18, 1972.41 Over the objections of the EPA42 and
Senator Muskie,43 the dredge and fill program (section 404) was separated
from the permit programs for other pollutants and the Corps was given pri-
mary jurisdiction over it.44 The Corps published regulations to implement its
new authority on April 3, 1974.45 These revisions to its permit regulations
incorporated the section 404 permit program and sought "to adopt a wetlands
policy that would protect wetlands within the Corps jurisdiction from unnec-
essary destruction. '46 The regulations, however, limited the scope of the sec-
tion 404 permit program to the same waters that were being regulated under
34. Id
35. Id
36. Id The Corps stated: "The decision as to whether a permit will be issued must rest on
an evaluation of all relevant factors, including the effect of the proposed work on navigation, fish
and wildlife, conservation, pollution, aesthetics, ecology, and the general public interest." 33 Fed.
Reg. 18,671 (1968).
37. 42 Fed. Reg. 37,122 (1977).
38. Definition of Navigable Waters of the United States, 37 Fed. Reg. 18,290 (1972). The
present definition of "navigable waters" for determining the jurisdiction of the Corps is codified at
33 C.F.R. § 329 (1982), and was first published in 42 Fed. Reg. 37,161 (1977).
39. 37 Fed. Reg. 18,290-91 (1972); 42 Fed. Reg. 37,122 (1977).
40. 37 Fed. Reg. 18,291 (1972).
41. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 404, 86
Stat. 816, 884 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (Supp. V 1981)).
42. HOUSE COMM. ON PUBLIC WORKS, FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT
AMENDMENTS OF 1972, H.R. REP. No. 911, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 168-69 (1972) (comments of Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency on H.R. 11895 and H.R. 11896), reprinted in 1 STAFF OF SENATE
COMM. ON PUBLIC WORKS, 93D CONG., IST SEss., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POL-
LUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, at 753, 855-56 (Comm. Print 1973) [hereinafter
cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1972 ACT].
43. 117 CONG. REc. 38,855 (1971) (statements of Sen. Muskie), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY 1972 ACT, supra note 42, at 1387-88, 1389. Senator Muskie was the prime mover of the
bill.
44. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
45. 39 Fed. Reg. 12,115-17 (1974). For the present regulations, see 33 C.F.R. § 323 (1982).
46. See 42 Fed. Reg. 37,123 (1977).
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the River and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899.4 7 The National Wildlife
Federation and the National Resources Defense Council challenged this limi-
tation in Natural Resources Defense Council v. Callaway.48 The environmental
groups expressed concern over the need to regulate the entire aquatic system,
including wetlands,49 tributaries to tidal and commercially navigable waters,
and isolated lakes dnd prairie potholes.50
On March 27, 1975, the District Court for the District of Columbia
granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment in Callaway and declared:
Congress by defining the term "navigable waters" in [the FWPCA] to
mean "the waters of the United States, including the territorial
seas," 5' asserted federal jurisdiction over the nation's waters to the
maximum extent permissible under the Commerce Clause of the
Constitution. Accordingly, as used in the Water Act, the term is not
limited to the traditional tests of navigability.5 2
Congress had expressed such an intent when it passed the 1972 amendments.5 3
The court ordered the rescission of all the 1974 regulations that limited "the
permit jurisdiction of the Corps of Engineers by definition or otherwise to
other than 'the waters of the United States,' "-54 and instructed the Corps to
publish regulations "recognizing the full regulatory mandate of the Water
Act." 55
The Corps published interim final regulations in response to the court
order on July 25, 1975.56 Those regulations contained a new, much broader
47. Id
48. 392 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1975).
49. Wetlands often lie above the arbitrary lines the Corps has set on its jurisdiction-namely,
mean high water marks and ordinary high water marks. See 42 Fed. Reg. 37,123 (1977); 123
CONG. REC. 26,716 (1977) (statement of Sen. Chafee), reprinted in 4 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1977
ACT, supra note 10, at 917.
50. See 42 Fed. Reg. 37,123-24 (1977). Prairie potholes are small, natural lakes of puzzling
origin that dot the northern prairie states. They are prime breeding grounds for various water-
fowl but tend to be too widely dispersed for inclusion of significant numbers of them in parkland
or other state-protected lands.
51. 33 U.S.C. § 1362 (7) (1976).
52. 392 F. Supp. at 686.
53. The House Report expressed a reluctance "to define. . . the term 'navigable waters'.
based on the fear that any interpretation would be read narrowly. However, this is not the Com-
mittee's intent." HousE COMM. ON PUBLIC WORKS, FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT
AMENDMENTS OF 1972, H.R. REP. No. 911, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 131 (1972), reprinted in 1 LEGIS-
LATIVE HISTORY 1972 ACT, supra note 42, at 753, 818. The Conference report and the House
report used identical language to further express congressional intent: "The conferees [Commit-
tee] fully intend[s] that the term 'navigable waters' be given the broadest possible constitutional
interpretation unencumbered by agency determinations which have been made or may be made
for administrative purposes." S. CONF. REP. No. 1236, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 144 (1972), reprinted in
1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3776, 3822, andin I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1972 ACT, supra
note 42, at 281, 327; HOUSE COMM. ON PUBLIC WORKS, FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL
ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, H.R. REP. No. 911, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 131 (1972), reprinted In 1
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1972 ACT, supra note 42, at 753, 818.
54. 392 F. Supp. at 686.
55. Id.
56. Revisions to Permit Regulations, 40 Fed. Reg. 31,319-44 (1975) (proposed to be codified
at 33 C.F.R. § 209.120). The court originally ordered thatf/nal regulations be published within 30
days of the order, dated March 27, 1975. 392 F. Supp. at 686.
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definition of the term "navigable waters,"' 57 which included wetlands, tributa-
ries, and certain intrastate lakes, 58 but excluded the headwaters of all of the
included waters. 59 The term "headwaters" was defined to mean the point
above which the normal flow is less than five cubic feet per second.60 The
definition also excluded small lakes from the Corps' jurisdiction by defining
"lakes" as "natural bodies of water greater than five acres in surface area and
all bodies of standing water created by the impounding of navigable waters. '6 1
These 1975 regulations adopted a three part phase-in schedule.62 Phase I
began immediately and encompassed all waters already regulated, plus the
wetlands of those waters. Primary tributaries and lakes larger than five acres
and the wetlands of these waters did not become subject to regulation until
over a year later when Phase II took effect. Finally, on July 1, 1977 all naviga-
ble waters of the United States gained the Corps' protection under Phase 111.63
Shortly afterwards, on July 19, 1977, the Corps finalized these regula-
tions.64 Significantly, a major difference between the 1975 interim final regu-
lations and the 1977 final regulations was the definition of navigable waters.
The Corps dropped its definitional method of excluding headwaters from its
jurisdiction.65 In its explanation of its new final regulations, the Corps stated
that it was making the definitional change in response to comments concern-
ing "the legality of excluding waters in rivers and streams above the headwa-
ters from the definition of waters of the United States."6 6 The Corps also
dropped its definitional exclusion of lakes of less than five acres in surface
area. 67 The Corps noted that commenters had questioned the legality of that
size limitation, "since a lake less than five acres in size is just as much a 'water
of the United States' as one that is more than five acres in size." 68 Neverthe-
less, the final regulations, while divested of the potentially illegal definitional
57. 40 Fed. Reg. 31,324-25 (1975).
58. Id.
59. Id. For example, proposed § 209.120(d)(2)(i)(e) of 33 C.F.R. included in the definition of
navigable waters "all tributaries of navigable waters of the United States up to their headwaters."
40 Fed. Reg. 31,324 (1975).
60. 40 Fed. Reg. 31,325 (1975) (proposed to be codified at 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(d)(2)(ii)(d)).
61. 40 Fed. Reg. 31,325 (1975) (proposed to be codified at 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(d)(2)(ii)(c)).
62. 40 Fed. Reg. 31,326 (1975).
63. Id; see 42 Fed. Reg. 37,124 (1977).
64. Final Permit Program Rules, 42 Fed. Reg. 37,121-64 (1977) (codified at 33 C.F.R. §§ 320-
329 (1982)).
65. 42 Fed. Reg. 37,144 (codified at 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(a) (1982)). The Corps phrased the
regulation in terms of "waters of the United States" instead of "navigable waters" to avoid confu-
sion with the Corps' other regulatory programs. Id.
66. 42 Fed. Reg. 37,129 (codified at 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(i) (1982)). The Corps also made a
clarifying change in the definition of headwaters. In place of specifying a water flow that is nor-
mally less than five cubic feet per second, the new regulation specified an average annual flow of
less than five cubic feet per second. In addition, the new regulation specified a method for esti-
mating that point on a given body of water. Id
67. 42 Fed. Reg. 37,144 (codified at 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(e) (1982)). The new definition sepa-
rated natural lakes and impoundments. A natural lake was defined as "a standing body of open
water that occurs in a natural depression fed by one or more streams and from which a stream
may flow, that occurs due to the widening or natural blockage of a river or stream, or that occurs
in an isolated natural depression that is not part of a surface river or stream." Id
68. 42 Fed. Reg. 37,129 (codified at 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(i) (1982)).
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exclusions, retained the exclusionary effect of the 1974 regulations, which were
held to be unduly restrictive in Callaway. The Corps accomplished this abro-
gation of its jurisdiction by issuing blanket nationwide permits for discharges
into essentially the same waters it had previously excluded from its jurisdiction
by definition.69 Although the waters subject to the permits were technically
under the protective jurisdiction of the Corps, the issuance of nationwide per-
mits effectively excluded the waters from Corps control. Two years after the
Callaway order, the Corps had settled on a regulatory scheme that avoided a
substantial part of the burdens created by that order.
Technically, the nationwide permits do not limit the Corps' jurisdiction.
The Corps is asserting its jurisdiction over the waters covered by the statute by
issuing the nationwide permits. The effect, however, is that the nationwide
permits, for all practical purposes, exclude wetlands from the Corps' jurisdic-
tion. Nationwide permits eliminate the need for individual permits for a given
category of activity, or for all activities in a given category of waters. Thus,
the Corps makes no independent evaluation of the environmental aspects of
such activities and does not have the opportunity to prohibit an activity or to
put special conditions on the permit in order to protect the environment. If a
nationwide permit is issued for discharges of dredge and fill material into all
headwaters, for example, a person may discharge as much material as he
wishes into any headwater without even notifying the Corps. 70
The advantage of the nationwide permits is an easing of the regulatory
burden on both the Corps and potential permittees.71 The position of the
Corps is that the environment will be sufficiently protected by the manage-
ment practices specified in its regulations72 and by the discretionary authority
given the division engineer to require individual or regional permits when he
feels the environment is not adequately protected.73 Requiring applications
for individual permits under section 404, however, is not necessarily an unrea-
69. Id. at 37,128. The Corps issued permits for four categories of waters: headwaters, lakes
under ten acres fed by headwaters, isolated lakes, and other isolated waters. The first three cate-
gories include the adjacent wetlands. 33 C.F.R. § 323.4 (1982).
70. While certain conditions must be met, those conditions mainly ensure that the discharges
do not violate other statutes or regulations (e.g., the Endangered Species Act). 47 Fed. Reg. 31,832
(1982) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. § 330.4(b)). Additionally, there is no evidence that the Corps
intends to police these conditions. See infra note 73.
71. Oversight Hearing on Section 404: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Environmental Pollu.
tion of the Senate Comm on Environment and Public Works, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. 392, 418-20
(statement of Robert K. Dawson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works) (1982)
(responses by Corps of Engineers representatives to questions) [hereinafter cited as Oversight
Hearing].
72. 42 Fed. Reg. 37,131 (1977). The latest management practices are promulgated at Interim
Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 47 Fed. Reg. 31,834 (1982) (to be
codified at 33 C.F.R. § 330.6).
73. 47 Fed. Reg. 31,834 (1982) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. § 330.7). Unfortunately, however,
neither the management practices, supra note 72, nor the division engineers' authority to issue
individual permits is mandatory. "Failure to comply with [the management] practices may be
cause for the district engineer to recommend or the division engineer to take discretionary author-
ity to regulate the activity on an individual or regional basis pursuant to § 330.7." 47 Fed. Reg.
31,834 (1982) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. § 330.6 (emphasis added)). Additionally, the majority of
the management practices are worded in terms of "avoiding" or "minimizing" the harmful prac-
tices, not in terms of eliminating them. See 33 C.F.R. § 323.4(b) (1982). Not only the efficacy, but
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sonable burden on permit applicants. 74 Certainly those who are denied per-
mits or whose permit applications propose significant enough action to require
review under the National Environmental Policy Act are burdened, but this is
the precise purpose of the statute. The law is not designed to ensure quick
approval of plans to destroy wetlands, but to protect those wetlands from un-
necessary destruction. 75
On September 19, 1980, the Corps of Engineers published proposed
rules76 to accommodate "legislative changes in the Clean Water Act, Execu-
tive Orders, judicial decisions and policy changes" occurring since the July 19,
1977, regulations were published. 77 These rules, with some changes, were re-
published on July 22, 1982, as interim final rules.78 By 1982 it had become
necessary to promulgate new nationwide permits anyway, because the statute
limits nationwide permits to a term of not more than five years.79 The new
nationwide permits with which this note is concerned80 provide:
Discharges of dredge or fill material into the following waters of the
United States are hereby permitted provided the conditions listed in
paragraph (b) of this section below are met:
(1) Non-tidal rivers, streams and their lakes and impound-
ments, including adjacent wetlands, that are located above
the headwaters.
(2) Other non-tidal waters of the United States (see 33 C.F.R.
& 323.2(a) (3)) that are not part of a surface tributary sys-
tem to interstate waters or navigable waters of the United
States.81
the very legality, of these and similar permissive provisions might be questioned, given the lan-
guage of § 404(e). See infra text accompanying notes 88-92.
In the five years this discretionary authority has existed under 33 C.F.R. § 323.4-4 (1982), the
district engineers' office in North Carolina has apparently never exercised it. Address by Richard
Jackson, Chief of Environmental Resources Branch, Wilmington, N.C. District, U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers (Dec. 1, 1982). This is despite conversion of 55,000 to 60,000 acres of wetlands for
use in corporate farming, peat mining, and other uses that destroy the character of the wetlands.
See infra note 92.
74. Section 404 of the Clean WaterAct: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Water Resources of
the House Comm on Public Works and Transportation, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. - (1982) (state-
ment of T. Tomasello, Counsel for Fisheries & Wildlife Program, National Wildlife Fed'n). Less
than 1.3% of the § 10 and § 404 permit applications submitted from 1977 through 1980 were de-
nied. From 1977 through 1981, the average processing time for 70% of the permit applications
received was less than 75 days. For all permit applications, except those requiring an environmen-
tal impact statement (EIS), the average was 131 days. Only 15 EIS's were prepared for permit
applications in fiscal year 1980.
75. Oversight Hearing, supra note 71, at 391 (remarks of Sen. Chafee).
76. Proposed Permit Program Rules, 45 Fed. Reg. 62,731-77 (1980).
77. 47 Fed. Reg. 62,794 (1982).
78. Interim Final Permit Program Rules, 47 Fed. Reg. 31,793-834 (1982) (to be codified at 33
C.F.R. §§ 320-330).
79. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972,33 U.S.C. § 1344(e)(2) (Supp.
V 1981).
80. A number of other nationwide permits for discharges occurring before certain dates and
for certain specific activities were also issued. See 47 Fed. Reg. 31,832-34 (1982) (to be codified at
33 C.F.R. §§ 330.3 to -.5).
81. 47 Fed. Reg. 31,832 (1982) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. § 330.4(a)). "Navigable waters of
the United States" is administratively defined separately from "navigable waters." The former
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These permits consolidate the four types of permits issued in 1977.82 The most
important change is the absence of any acreage restriction on lakes for which
the permits are issued. Under the new rules dredging and filling activities on
any lake that is located above the headwaters or that is not part of a surface
tributary system to interstate waters or navigable waters of the United States
may be undertaken without individual permits.
The 1982"nationwide permits were issued under the purported authority
of section 404(e) of the FWPCA.8 3 As will be seen below, the language of the
FWPCA indicates that nationwide permits for these categories of waters are
an overstepping of authority by the Corps.84 Although the statute certainly
authorizes the issuance of nationwide permits, the statute contemplates such
permits for categories of activities, not for categories of waters. The Corps has
issued over a score of these permits for categories of activities ranging from
fish harvesting to minor road crossing fills.85 The statute does not authorize
issuance of carte blanche nationwide permits for all activities in broad catego-
ries of waters.86 The Corps, however, anticipates this objection by asserting
that "those permits and others were in effect at the time [1977] Congress
adopted section 404(e). The legislative history clearly shows Congress' intent
to endorse the program in effect at the time and to encourage its expansion."
87
This claim of congressional ratification, however, is not supported by the legis-
lative history of section 404.
An analysis of the statute to determine whether it supports the Corps'
issuance of nationwide permits for categories of waters must begin with the
language of sections 404(e):
In carrying out his functions relating to the discharge of dredged or
fill material under this section, the Secretary may, after notice and
opportunity for public hearing, issue general permits on a State, re-
gional, or nationwide basis for any category of activities involving
discharges of dredged or fill material if the Secretary determines that
the activities in such category are similar in nature, will cause only
minimal adverse environmental effects whan performed separately,
and will have only minimal cumulative adverse effect on the environ-
ment ....
• ..No general permit issued under this subsection shall be for
a period of more than five years after the date of its issuance .... 88
The language is plain enough. The section consistently speaks of categories of
term is defined to include only waters "subject to the ebb and flow of the tide. . . and/or that are
presently used, or have been used in the past, or may be susceptible to use to transport interstate or
foreign commerce." 33 C.F.R. §§ 323.2(b), 329 (1982).
82. 47 Fed. Reg. 31,798-99 (1982). The former regulations permitting four categories of dis-
charges can be found at 33 C.F.R. § 323.4-2(a) (1982). See supra note 69.
83. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(e) (Supp. V 1981); see infra text accompanying note 88.
84. See infra text accompanying notes 88-94.
85. 47 Fed. Reg. 31,832-34 (1982) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. § 330.5(a)).
86. See infra text accompanying notes 88-94.
87. 47 Fed. Reg. 31,798 (1982).
88. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(e) (Supp. V 1981) (emphasis added).
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activities, not the vast categories of waters the Corps has described in its
permits. 89
The statutory language provides further guidance beyond intuitive mean-
ings. First, the very nature of the permits-being for categories of waters-
precludes the Corps from complying with statutory requirements. The statute
mandates that the Secretary determine "that the activities in such category are
similar in nature." 90 Since permits for categories of waters allow all dredge
and fill activities without discriminating between types of activities, this statu-
tory requirement is clearly violated. No one can possibly determine that the
activities in all headwaters and isolated lakes are similar in nature without
specifying what activities are involved, unless, for example, filling an entire
lake or marsh with coal mine spoil is deemed "similar in nature" to putting up
a small boat dock. Second, the Secretary cannot determine, as the statute
requires, that the cumulative adverse environmental impacts will be mini-
mal,9 1 since the permits set no limit on the number of acres of waters and
wetlands that may be altered or destroyed. The statutory requirement can be
met only if the Corps is prepared to find that total destruction of all headwa-
ters and isolated lakes and wetlands would cause only minimal adverse envi-
ronmental impact.92
There are other factors that conflict with the Corps' equation of categories
of waters with categories of activities. First, the new regulations themselves
support the distinction here asserted by separating the two types of permits.
The Corps used the phrase "Nationwide permits for discharges into certain
waters" in section 330.4 and "Nationwide permits for specific activities" in
section 330.5. 93 Second, one of the few acknowledgements of the 1977 nation-
wide permits in the legislative history of the FWPCA also makes the wa-
ters/activities distinction. The House conferees, in describing the existing
nationwide permits, did not treat nationwide permits for waters as part of the
similar-in-nature/minimal-impact permit program projected by section 404:
Among other things these regulations permitted on a nationwide ba-
sis the discharge of a dredged or fill material into nontidal rivers and
streams above the headwaters and lakes that are less than 10 acres in
surface area, provided that certain specified management practices
are followed. . . . Finally, the regulations provide for the issuance
of general permits for activities which are substantially similar in na-
ture, that cause only minimal adverse [impact separately and
89. When a government attorney at a legislative oversight hearing asserted that all conceiva-
ble activities in headwaters constitute a category of activities under the statute, laughter erupted
from the mixed crowd of observers and participants. Oversight Hearing, supra note 71, at 409-10
(statement of Carol E. Dinkins, Assistant Attorney General for Land and Natural Resources).
90. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(e)(I).
91. Id.
92. This is not as farfetched as it may seem. The drawing of lines at headwaters under the
nationwide permits has allowed 55,000 to 60,000 acres of conversion of wetlands to agricultural
fields in only the past two years in eastern North Carolina alone. Address by Derb Carter, Direc-
tor of Carolina Wetlands Project, in Chapel Hill, N.C. (Nov. 29,1982); see also supra notes 9-14
and accompanying text.
93. 47 Fed. Reg. 31,832 (1982) (emphasis added).
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cumulatively]. 94
The language of section 404(e), then, although it is susceptible to more
than one interpretation, is reasonably clear. It says that nationwide permits
for categories of activities are authorized; nationwide permits for categories of
waters, not restricted to specified activities, are beyond the bounds of the au-
thority granted.
Notwithstanding the questions of statutory authority above, the Corps
contends that Congress ratified the permit scheme when it amended the
FWPCA in 1978. Ratification is a judicial doctrine that holds, in broad terms,
that reenactment or amendment of a statute with congressional knowledge or
approval of a prior administrative interpretation of parts of that statute evinces
congressional approval of that interpretation unless Congress indicates other-
wise.95 The courts use the doctrine in determining whether an agency's inter-
pretation of a statute comports with the legislative intent.9 6 Because the
doctrine of ratification is a doctrine of judicial construction, it is susceptible to
a wide range of interpretations and applications.
There are several variables that affect the application of the doctrine.
Some courts seem satisfied with congressional knowledge of the administrative
interpretations, but others require explicit approval. 97 Courts vary in the
amount and type of evidence necessary to indicate that Congress did approve
or had knowledge. 98 Moreover, because ratification is in large measure a mat-
ter of deference to agency interpretation,9 9 courts may also scrutinize the cir-
cumstances surrounding the interpretation. More deference is given to a
contemporaneous construction of an enabling statute, l ee and to an agency in-
terpretation that comports with the apparent meaning of the statute.101
The Supreme Court enunciation of the doctrine that most nearly justifies
the Corps' position is contained in United States v. Rutherford,10 2 in which
terminally ill cancer patients sued to enjoin the FDA from prohibiting inter-
state sale of Laetrile, a drug the FDA believed to be unsafe or ineffective.
Addressing the agency's interpretation that the statutory "safe and effective"
requirement applied with equal force to drugs for terminally ill and
nonterminally ill patients, the Court stated: "But once an agency's statutory
construction has been 'fully brought to the attention of the public and Con-
gress,' and the latter has not sought to alter that interpretation although it has
94. 123 CONG. REC. 38,968 (1977) (statement of Rep Roberts), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY 1977 ACT, supra note 10, at 348.
95. United States v. Board of Comm'rs, 435 U.S. 110, 134-35 (1978); see also Agusti, The
Effect of Prior Judicial and 4dministrative Constructions on Codfication of Pre-existing Federal
Statutes: The Case ofthe Federal Securities Code, 15 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 367, 368-69, 384 (1978).
96. See United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 554 n.10 (1979).
97. See infra notes 169-75 and accompanying text.
98. See infra text accompanying notes 102-40.
99. See Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 192 (1969); Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842,
864-70 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 917 (1973).
100. Zuber, 396 U.S. at 192; see SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 120 (1978).
101. See infia text accompanying notes 105 & 113.
102. 442 U.S. 544 (1979).
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amended the statute in other respects, then presumably the legislative intent
has been correctly discerned."103
Two special factors in Rutherford were important to the result. First, evi-
dence of congressional awareness of the agency's interpretation was not con-
fined to the legislative history. The extreme public notoriety of the Laetrile
controversy, including consideration by thirty-one states of laws allowing pro-
duction and sale of Laetrile within their borders, convinced the Court that
Congress surely would have directed a change in the administrative interpreta-
tion if it had so desired. 1' 4 Second, the Court found that the administrative
policy in question "comports with the plain language, history, and prophylac-
tic purpose of the Act."105
Another case in which the Supreme Court found the doctrine of congres-
sional ratification dispositive was United States v. Board of Commissioners.10 6
The Court there found more than mere knowledge of the issue by Congress; it
held that Congress had actually approved the result in dispute. This was a
case brought under the Voting Rights Act in which the Court found that the
preclearance provisions of section five applied to all political subdivisions, re-
gardless of whether the subdivision registers voters. This had been the Attor-
ney General's longstanding interpretation. 10 7 The Court stated, "When a
Congress that re-enacts a statute voices its approval of an administrative or
other interpretation thereof, Congress is treated as having adopted that inter-
pretation, and this Court is bound thereby."' 1 8 The approval the Court found
was largely implicit. It consisted of legislative history in which members of
Congress made statements that assumed the interpretations in question. For
example, one Congressman had stated that section five applies to Texas school
districts and cities, both of which are political subdivisions that do not register
voters. 0 9 The Court listed several similar statements, the cumulative result of
which was a clear showing of approval."10
In a third case, however, the Supreme Court refused to find ratification,
despite some evidence of congressional approval. In SEC v. Sloan"' the
Court held that even a committee report's recognition and approval of the
Commission's interpretation, followed by amendment and reenactment of the
statute, was not enough to indicate general congressional awareness or ap-
proval. 112 As in Rutheford and Sheffeld, the particular circumstances of the
approval were important to the Court's conclusion. The Court found the
Commission's practice to be contrary to the overall structure and intent of the
103. Id at 554 n.10.
104. Id.
105. Id at 554.
106. 435 U.S. 110, 134 (1978).
107. Id at 131.
108. Id at 134.
109. Id
110. Id at 134-35.
II1. 436 U.S. 103 (1978).
112. Id at 119-20.
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statute. 13 Justice Brennan's concurrence pointed out that the SEC had been
severely abusing the practice of "tacking" ten-day summary suspension peri-
ods, without apparent justification. 1 4 Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the
Court also pointed out that the interpretation of the SEC was not made con-
temporaneously with the statute's passage."-'
The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals has been more con-
sistently reluctant to find congressional ratification.116 Thompson v. CIfflord 117
involved the question whether Army regulations denying national cemetery
interment to felons comported with the Cemetery Act. Congress had passed
amendments to the Cemetery Act twice during the twenty years the Secretary
had been denying cemetery interment to felons. In addition, the felon exlu-
sion rule had appeared in the Federal Register." 8 Noting that the govern-
ment "relfied] on the canon of statutory construction that reenactment without
change after a course of administrative interpretation is tantamount to legisla-
tive ratification of the interpretation," '" 9 the court stated that "[tihe rationale
of that canon must be either that those in charge of the amendment are famil-
iar with existing rulings, or that they mean to incorporate them." 120 The court
refused to apply the canon because it found no evidence that the felon exclu-
sion rule had come to the attention of Congress.' 21
InAssociation ofAmerican Railroads v. ICC122 the D.C. Circuit stated the
rule as follows: "[To bring this 'doctrine of re-enactment' into play, Congress
must not only have been made aware of the administrative interpretation, but
must also have given some 'affirmative indication' of such intent [to ratify the
administrative interpretation]."' 123 The Interstate Commerce Commission had
for thirty-five years interpreted the custom-of-the-trade provision of section
903(b) of the Interstate Commerce Act 124 to exempt from ICC regulation only
the carriage by water of those commodities actually carried in bulk as of June
1, 1939.125 The ICC vigorously supported elimination of the custom-of-the-
trade provision before Congress in 1967 and 1973, and clearly made Congress
aware of its consistent interpretation of the provision.' 26 The court held that
the refusal of Congress to change the provision expressed its satisfaction with
113. Id at 118, 121.
114. Id at 123-25 (Brennan, J., concurring).
115. Id at 120;see also Zuber, 396 U.S. 168, 192 (1969).
116. Any action challenging the Corps' permits will most likely be brought in the District
Court for the District of Columbia, simply because the environmental groups concerned are based
there.
117. 408 F.2d 154 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
118. Id at 164.
119. Id
120. Id. (quoting Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 154 F.2d 785, 790 (2d Cir.),
af'd, 328 U.S. 275 (1946)).
121. Thompson, 408 F.2d at 164.
122. 564 F.2d 486 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
123. Id at 493.
124. 49 U.S.C. § 903(b) (1976) (repealed 1978). A nearly identical provision appears in the
replacement statute. 49 U.S.C. § 10,542(a)(1) (Supp; V 1981).
125. 564 F.2d at 489.
126. Id at 490-92.
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the interpretation of the ICC.12 7 Therefore, the ICC was precluded by the
doctrine of reenactment or ratification from radically changing its interpreta-
tion in 1975.128
The case most damaging to the Corps' position is National Petroleum Re-
finers Association v. FTC.129 The question in that case was whether the FTC,
under its governing statute, was empowered to promulgate substantive rules of
business conduct. The FTC had long taken the position that it did not have
such a power.' 30 Congress was made fully aware of this interpretation, and
passed a series of laws granting the FTC substantive rulemaking powers in
limited, discrete areas, apparently on the premise that the earlier law withheld
such authority.'13 Nevertheless, the court refused to find a legislative intent to
approve the FTC's construction. It took a dim view of the doctrine of implied
congressional ratification:
Where there has been evidence of congressional knowledge of and
acquiescence in a long-standing agency construction of its own pow-
ers, courts have occasionally concluded that the agency construction
had received a defacto ratification by Congress ...
But defacto ratification through acquiescence in an administra-
tive construction is not lightly attributed. 132
The Court raised some very practical and sensible concerns about quick appli-
cation of the doctrine:
[I]t can be argued quite plausibly that imputing ratification in this
fashion fails to take into account significant practical aspects of the
legislative process: those legislators actually aware of the construc-
tion in question may not have been so concerned as to raise it to the
attention of most members, and even in the event some legislators
were deeply troubled by the construction, the press of other business
was such as to keep the question on the "back burner."' 1
33
Presumably, any challenge to the nationwide permit regulations would be
brought in the District of Columbia Circuit. 13 4 Two recent cases from other
circuits, however, are also relevant on the issue. Moore v. Harris 135 concerned
the restrictive interpretation by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Wel-
fare of the word "employed" under the black lung statute. Although one Sen-
ator mentioned the Secretary's interpretation during committee hearings prior
to the 1972 amendments, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals was not con-
vinced that Congress knew about the interpretation. 136 The 1972 amendments
127. Id at 493-94.
128. Id at 494.
129. 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974).
130. Id at 693.
131. Id at 695-96.
132. Id at 695 (citations omitted).
133. Id. (footnotes omitted).
134. See supra note 116.
135. 623 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980).
136. Id at 920. A possibly misleading letter from the Secretary to Congress also weighed in
the court's decision. Id at 917, 920-21.
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remedied some of the Secretary's misinterpretations, but "[w]hen Congress
remedies some administrative misinterpretations of an existing statute, it does
not act at the risk of barring courts from correcting other misinterpretations on
which Congress does not then focus its attention." 137
In the second case, United States v. Colahan,138 the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals evinced less reluctance to find ratification, quoting from the Supreme
Court's language in United States v. Rutherford.139 In Colahan, however, the
FDA had been interpreting the statute in question consistently for over forty
years. In addition, Congress had been aware of the interpretation for the en-
tire period and had revised the statute in 1951 and 1962.140
To ascertain whether the Corps' nationwide permit program should be
deemed to have been ratified by Congress, it is first necessary to gauge the
extent to which the legislative history of the Clean Water Act of 1977 reflects
the knowledge, approval, or intent to ratify that the cases require. The Senate
history is most important because the version of section 404 eventually passed
-is substantially the same as the Senate version. 141 In fact, Senator Muskie said
in his floor statement on the provisions of the conference report dealing with
permits for discharges of dredged or fill material that "the Senate Report and
floor statements at the time of Senate passage are still adequate reflections of
legislative intent with respect to this program."142
Evidence that the Senate was unaware that permits were being issued for
categories of waters is provided by the absence of reference to such permits
when one would have expected reference to them. This occurs in several in-
stances when various Senators or reports describe the Corps' program and
mention permits for categories of activities, but not for categories of waters.
The fifteen-member Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works,
and Senator Baker individually, both mentioned the Corps' issuance of na-
tionwide permits and listed a string of examples. 143 In these comments, how-
ever, mention of nationwide permits for categories of waters was
137. Id at 921.
138. 635 F.2d 564 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 831 (1981).
139. Id at 568 (quoting Rutherford, 442 U.S. at 554 n. 10); see supra note 102 and accompany-
ing text.
140. 653 F.2d at 568.
141. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 830, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 97-105 (1977) (comparing provisions
in House bill, Senate amendment, and Conference substitute concerning permits for discharges of
dredged or fill material), reprintedin 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4424, 4472-80, andin 3
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1977 ACT, supra note 10, at 185, 281-89. Compare Clean Water Act of
1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, § 67, 91 Stat. 1566, 1600-06 (1977) (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (Supp.
V 1981)) with H.R. 3199 (as reported), 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 16, 123 CONG. REC. 10,420-21
(1977), reprinted in 4 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1977 ACT, supra note 10, at 1167, 1182-87 and S.
1952, 95th Cong., 1st Seas. § 49(a)-(b), reprinted in 4 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1977 ACT, supra note
10, at 555, 619-27.
142. 123 CONG. REC. 39,187 (1977) (statement of Sen. Muskie), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY 1977 ACT, supra note 10, at 470.
143. The following is contained in the Senate report submitted to accompany S. 1952:
The Corps during the last 2 years of administering the section 404 program has
issued general permits on a regional and nationwide basis to eliminate the need for indi-
vidual permits for a number of activities involving the discharge of dredged of fill mate-
rial. These include streambank protection, stream alteration, backfill for bridges, erosion
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conspicuously absent. The statements were directed at assuaging the fears of
opponents who felt that the section 404 program would be too burdensome
and who wanted the Corps' jurisdiction restricted to literally navigable wa-
ters.144 Failure to mention nationwide permits for categories of waters, which
would alleviate regulatory burdens and restrict the Corps' jurisdiction, must
indicate either a lack of knowledge of the existence of such permits or an in-
tent that such permits should not be authorized under the new bill.145
There are two incidental instances in the Senate history when recognition
of the Corps' regulations would have been expected. A letter from Stuart
Eizenstat to Senator Dole mentioned the May 16, 1977 proposed regulations; it
also stated that these regulations will "resolve many of the fears raised over
unnecessary regulation in Phase III waters," without specifically mentioning
the permits for categories of waters."46 Second, Senator Bartlett, speaking in
support of an amendment by Senator Bentsen, stated that rejecting the amend-
ment would have the effect of ratifying "the court decision to expand the juris-
diction of the corps to all bodies of water, both public and private, in excess of
5 acres."'147
control, and, in at least one instance, a general permit for road fill and culverting on a
statewide basis.
SENATE COMM. ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS, CLEAN WATER ACT OF 1977, S. REP.
No. 370, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 80, reprintedin 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4326, 4405, and
in 4 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1977 ACT, supra note 10, at 633, 713.
In the Senate debate on S. 1952, Senator Baker, one of the prime proponents of the bill, said
that the need to apply for "individual permits is eliminated except in those instances involving
environmentally significant activities. General permits to authorize erosion control bulkhead and
fill and for fills associated with highways and long roads have already been issued and the com-
mittee amendment allows this practice to continue." 123 CONG. REC. 26,718 (1977) (statement of
Sen. Baker), reprinted in 4 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1977 ACT, supra note 10, at 922.
144. For example, the Senate report addressed regulatory burdens with respect to specific ac-
tivities: "For general construction activities, general permits issued on a statewide or regionwide
basis will greatly reduce administrative paperwork and delay." SENATE COMM. ON ENVIRON-
MENT AND PUBLIC WORKS, CLEAN WATER ACT OF 1977, supra note 143.
Senator Bentsen spoke of a "quagmire of disruption," "bureaucratic entanglement," and how
"[s]ection 404 ... has become synonymous with Federal overregulation, overcontrol, [and] cum-
bersome bureaucratic procedures." 123 CONG. REC. 26,711 (1977) (statement of Sen. Bentsen),
reprinted in 4 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1977 ACT, supra note 10, at 902-03.
145. See infra text accompanying note 148-49.
146. Letter from Stuart E. Eizenstat, Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs & Policy,
to Sen. Bob Dole (June 27, 1977), 123 CONG. REC. 26,723 (1977) (statement of Sen. Dole), re-
printed in 4 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1977 ACT, supra note 10, at 934.
147. 123 CONG. REC. 26,726 (1977) (statement of Sen. Bartlett), reprinted in 4 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY 1977 ACT, supra note 10, at 943. Senator Tower, an ardent opponent of the committee
bill, made this statement:
Those favoring the committee provision assume that the definition presently used by
the corps will remain constant, and that, as a result, streams with a discharge of less than
5 cubic feet per second and standing bodies of water less than 10 acres will be exempt
forever from permit requirements.
123 CONG. REc. 26,722 (1977) (statement of Sen. Tower), reprinted in 4 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
1977 ACT, supra note 10, at 931. At first glance, this seems to be evidence that Senator Tower
knew about the permits, but on close examination the statement is evidence of just the opposite.
He speaks of the "definition" the Corps is using. Those definitions were dropped by the Corps in
1977 when it adopted the nationwide permits. Senator Tower's further statement that passage of
the committee bill without the Bentsen amendment, see infra note 163, will mean regulation of
"every... damp spot" in the nation, id, shows apparent knowledge of Natural Resources De-
fense Council v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1975), see supra notes 48-55 and accompany-
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An interesting piece of legislative history is a brief exchange between Sen-
ators Muskie and Nunn during a Senate debate. Senator Muskie refused to
give direct approval to the Corps' 1977 nationwide permits, but then seemingly
reversed himself in his final sentence:
Mr. NUNN ....
Last month, the corps issued nationwide permits with respect to
certain dredge and fill activities. This amendment contemplated
such permits, and I assume that your committee thought the activities
now permitted in the corps' nationwide permits are within the pow-
ers of the corps by these amendments [the Senate bill's version of
eventual section 404(e) of the Clean Water Act].
Mr. MUSKIE. The committee did not specifically endorse the
corps' nationwide permit regulations already issued. The content of
such general nationwide permits would be a matter of agency inter-
pretation of the language of this amendment. The bill does, how-
ever, grant authority for nationwide permits as contemplated in the
recent corps regulations. 148
The first and last sentences of Senator Muskie's statement in isolation seem
contradictory. The middle sentence may be the key. Taken together, Senator
Muskie's first two sentences make it clear that prior practice is of no conse-
quence; the Corps is to interpret the new law and, of course, this interpretation
is subject to court review. The last sentence is simply a generic statement that
nationwide permits are permitted under the new law. There is no evidence
that either Senator Muskie or Senator Nunn knew that any of the 1977 permits
were for categories of waters. Senator Nunn's question concerning "permits
with respect to certain dredge and fill activities" adds to the significance of
Senator Muskie's choice of words.
The history in the House of Representatives is relevant insofar as it per-
tains to the conference bill; the House bill contained a very different version of
section 404, and was rejected in conference. The House legislative history
shows one instance of knowledge of the permits in question. This is a state-
ment made by Congressman Roberts during the House debate following his
submission of the House conference report on H.R. 3199. His statement de-
scribes rather accurately, without elaboration, the July 19, 1977, nationwide
permits. 149 Although his statement indicates an awareness of the nationwide
ing text, but is further evidence of his ignorance of the nationwide permits (or his assumption that
the permits would be illegal after passage of the bill). No one corrected the Senator.
148. 123 CONG. REC. 26,771 (1977) (statements of Sens. Nunn & Muskie), reprinted in 4 LEO-
ISLATIVE HISTORY 1977 AcT, supra note 10, at 1054. See also infra note 151.
149. Congressman Roberts was stating "for the record the understandings and intentions of
the House conferees with regard to some of the matters agreed to in the conference with the
Senate." 123 CONG. REC. 38,952 (1977) (statement of Rep. Roberts), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY 1977 AcT, supra note 10, at 305. He described the permits in the following way:
On July 19, 1977, the Corps of Engineers promulgated revised regulations imple-
menting section 404. . . . Among other things these regulations permitted on a nation-
wide basis the discharge of dredged or fill material into nontidal rivers and streams
above the headwaters and lakes that are less than 10 acres. . . . Finally, the regulations
provide for the issuance of general permits for activities which are substantially similar
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permits, it evidences no approval of those permits.
To briefly summarize the extent of congressional awareness and approval
of the nationwide permit scheme, there is some indication that the House con-
ferees and Congressman Roberts knew about the permits for categories of wa-
ters.150 There is, however, no evidence of general knowledge among other
members of either body. These permits were never a topic of discussion in the
extensive debate over Corps jurisdiction and burdensome regulations. There
is certainly no persuasive evidence of approval of these permits. 51
On the other side of the question, there is the clear evidence of congres-
sional intent to protect all the nation's waters, specifically wetlands.1 2 As the
Senate report on S. 1952 said, "[T]he committee amendment intends to assure
continued protection of all the Nation's waters. . . ,,1s3 Senator Baker con-
cluded his remarks in the Senate debate by "emphasiz[ing] that the protection
of water quality must encompass the protection of the interior wetlands and
smaller streams."' 54 Senator Hart challenged the body to pass the conference
version with these words:
The Congress can abandon the national interest. The Congress can
permit activities of a dredge-and-fill nature to go forward on those
small streams, marshes, wetlands, and swamps which will make their
way into the bigger waterways of this country and have a tremendous
adverse effect. . . . Or we can establish a program of the sort the
committee has established, which will protect all of those water sys-
tems .... 155
Senators extolled the virtues of wetlands in extensive passages which recog-
nized that destruction has been extensive and must be moderated, and that
in nature, that cause only minimal adverse environmental impact... separately, and
* * ' cumulative[ly].
Id at 38,968, reprintedin 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1977 ACT, supra note 10, at 348.
150. See supra note 149 and accompanying text. More likely, Congressman Murphy's state-
ment concerning the House Conference report shows only that whoever wrote the lengthy state-
ment knew of the permits.
151. The Corps' nationwide permits were promulgated while Congress was considering the
FWPCA amendments in the summer of 1977, and after both the House and Senate had published
their versions of the amended bill. This fact may be important in assessing what knowledge and
intent Congress possessed when passing § 404(e). First, the promulgation of the nationwide per-
mits in the middle of consideration of the amendments is likely to have escaped the notice of most
members. The 1977 amendments were far-reaching and complex; section 404 was just one small
part and the nationwide permit provision an almost obscure part. A second possibility is that the
Writers of the bill, when and if they learned of the Corps' new complication, were unwilling to
reopen § 404 at such a late stage and risk disturbing the delicate balance of compromise that had
been achieved in the bill. See supra note 144 and accompanying text. This may explain Senator
Muskie's evasive answer to Senator Nunn's question about the Corps' permits. See supra text
accompanying note 148.
152. Since the doctrine of ratification (reenactment) is just one method a court may use in
ascertaining legislative intent, see Sloan, 436 U.S. at 120; Zuber, 396 U.S. at 192, a look at other
indicators of legislative intent is relevant.
153. SENATE COMM. ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS, CLEAN WATER ACT OF 1977,
supra note 143.
154. 123 CONG. REc. 26,719 (1977) (statement of Sen. Baker), reprinted in 4 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY 1977 AT, supra note 10, at 923.
155. 123 CONG. Rac. 26,713 (1977) (statement of Sen. Hart), reprinted in 4 LEGISLATIVE His-
TORY 1977 AT, supra note 10, at 908.
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section 404 was designed to facillitate the moderation.' 56 Senator Muskie
ended his remarks by stating, "[Tihe unregulated destruction of these areas is
a matter which needs to be corrected and which implementation of section 404
has attempted to achieve."'157 In stark contrast to these expressions of concern,
the Corps' nationwide permits remove this protection from a substantial por-
tion of the nation's wetlands.
A second important point emerges from the legislative history. In all the
cases on the doctrine of ratification abstracted above,158 Congress had
amended the statute in question without changing the section that was the
subject of the litigated interpretation. But in the case of section 404(e), Con-
gress has specifically set forth a nationwide permit program, with quite specific
requirements, where only the challenged administrative regulations had ex-
isted before. As indicated by Senator Muskie, t 59 the amendment created new
law for the Corps to interpret in granting nationwide permits; what the Corps
had done before became irrelevant. Senator Baker said that "[t]he conferees
have resolved the long-standing controversy that has engulfed the section 404
permit program."'160 Senator Randolph, also speaking of the eventually
adopted conference report, noted the "complex regulatory procedure set up by
the corps" in response to Natural Resources Defense Council v. Callaway, and
announced the perceived need for "a new statement of congressional in-
tent."'161 He went on to say, "I believe H.R. 3199, in its present form, provides
that clarification and necessary direction. It recognizes that there must be no
basic gaps in the program for protection of wetlands and waterways from con-
tamination .... ",162
Congress had the opportunity to approve an amendment which would
have had an effect similar to that of the Corps' nationwide permits for catego-
ries of waters. This was the Bentsen amendment, which would have limited
the Corps' jurisdiction to actually navigable waters and their adjacent wet-
lands.' 63 The Senate defeated the amendment. Similarly, the portion of the
156. 123 CONG. REc. 26,701-02, 26,713, 26,716-17, 26,718-19 (1977) (statements of Sens. Mus-
kie, Stafford, Hart, Chafee & Baker) reprinted in 4 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1977 ACT, supra note
10, at 869, 881-82, 908, 916-20, 920-23.
157. 123 CONG. REC. 26,697 (1977) (statement of Sen. Muskie), reprinted in 4 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY 1977 AcT, supra note 10, at 869.
158. See supra text accompanying notes 102-40.
159. See supra text accompanying note 148.
160. 123 CONG. REC. 39,209 (1977) (statement of Sen. Baker), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY 1977 AcT, supra note 10, at 523.
161. 123 CONG. Rac. 39,196 (1977) (statement of Sen. Randolph), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY 1977 ACT, supra note 10, at 494.
162. Id
163. 123 CONG. REC. 26,710-11 (1977) (statement of Sen. Bentsen), reprinted in 4 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY 1977 AcT, supra note 10, at 901-02. The proposed amendment no. 726 provided in
pertinent part:
Such section 404 is further amended by adding at the end thereof the following new
subsections:
"(d)(1) The term 'navigable waters' as used in this section shall mean all waters
which presently are used, or are susceptible to use in their natural condition or by
reasonable improvement as a means to transport interstate or foreign commerce
[Vol. 61
PERMITS TO FILL WETLANDS
House bill that would have severely limited the scope of section 404 was re-
placed in conference committee.164 The Conference bill passed by both
houses provides for complete exemptions for normal farming and agricultural
practices, 165 because complaints from farmers about regulation of petty activi-
ties has been a primary source of congressional dissatisfaction with the old
version of section 404.166 In short, Congress had opportunities to do what the
Corps is trying to do administratively; it rejected them and dealt with the is-
sues as it saw fit.
In conclusion, there is evidence that House conferees may have known of
the Corps' nationwide permits for categories of waters. 167 Perhaps knowledge
can be imputed to others from this, since the description in the House debate
was printed in the Congressional Record 168 Two of the ratification cases 169
surveyed found knowledge, as opposed to approval, sufficient for congres-
sional ratification. But in Rutheford, in which the knowledge standard was
followed, 170 the Supreme Court stated that the agency's interpretation must be
"fully brought to the attention of public and Congress." 171 In addition, al-
though the Court found that this condition had been satisfied, it was dealing
with the issue of the FDA's treatment of Laetrile, one of the most notorious
instances of agency action in recent history. Section 404 of the FWPCA does
not approach having the notoriety of Laetrile. The Sixth Circuit followed
Rutherford in an area involving less publicity, but involving consistent inter-
pretation by the FDA for forty years.' 72 In no case has the District of Colum-
bia Circuit found knowledge sufficient.
There is no evidence of congressional approval in the legislative history,
but approval is the minimum evidence required in many of the ratification
cases.1 73 In fact, in Sloan 174 the Supreme Court found evidence of approval
"(e) Except as provided in subsection (f) of this section, the discharge of dredg-
ed or fill material in waters 6ther than navigable waters and in wetlands other than
adjacent wetlands is not prohibited by or otherwise subject to regulation under this
Act ...."
164. H.R. 3199 (as introduced), 95th Cong., Ist Sess. § 16 (1977), reprinted in 4 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY 1977 AcT, supra note 10, at 1143, 1157-61;see supra note 141; see also supra note 163
(the relevant portions of H.R. 3199 (as introduced) are identical to the quoted portions of the
Bentsen amendment).
165. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f) (Supp. V 1981).
166. 123 CONG. REc. 26,712-13 (1977) (statement of Sen. Hart), reprinted in 4 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY 1977 AcT, supra note 10, at 907-08.
167. See supra notes 147-50 and accompanying text.
168. See supra note 149.
169. United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544 (1979); United States v. Colahan, 635 F.2d 564
(6th Cir. 1980).
170. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
171. 442 U.S. at 554 n.10.
172. United States v. Colahan, 635 F.2d 564 (6th Cir. 1980); see supra text accompanying
notes 138-40.
173. See SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103 (1978); United States v. Board of Comm'rs, 435 U.S. 110
(1978); Association of Am. R.Rs. v. ICC, 564 F.2d 486 (D.C. Cir. 1977); National Petroleum
Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974). Addition-
ally, intent to ratify was the alternative requirement in Thompson v. Clifford, 408 F.2d 154 (D.C.
Cir. 1968), see supra text accompanying note 120.
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and still refused to find ratification. Moreover, the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals has demonstrated its disenchantment with the doctrine
itself, going beyond a mere requirement of congressional approval. 75
Various additional facts and circumstances that were so crucial to the rat-
ification decisions discussed in this note are inconsistent with the Corps' inter-
pretation as well. Whereas the courts are more likely to find ratification of
longstanding interpretations,176 the Corps' interpretation was promulgated
only a few months before passage of the 1977 amendments.177 Courts also
give more weight to an administrative interpretation when the agency "con-
temporaneously interpreted the statute upon being charged with its implemen-
tation in the first instance."'178 This extra weight is not available to the Corps;
the nationwide permits were published before section 404(e) was ever passed.
In fact, this timing is consistent with evidence that Congress intended to sup-
plant the Corps' nationwide permits with new policy of its own. 179
Finally, on the most basic level, the Corps' interpretation is contrary to
the plain meaning of the statute. The Supreme Court's approval of the agency
interpretation in Rutherford was based in large part on the interpretation's
consistent construction with the statutory language.180 And a finding that the
agency's interpretation was contrary to the overall structure and intent of the
statute was an important factor in the Court's disapproval of an interpretation
in Sloan.' 8 '
All these considerations weigh heavily against the Corps' claim of con-
gressional ratification.' 82 As the District of Columbia Circuit has stated, a
court "has a duty to ignore [an administrative interpretation] should it deter-
174. 436 U.S. 103 (1978). See supra text accompanying notes 111-13.
175. See supra text accompanying notes 129-33; see also supra text accompanying notes 116-28.
176. See, e.g., United States v. Board of Comm'rs, 435 U.S. 110 (1978) (longstanding); United
States v. Colahan, 635 F.2d 564 (6th Cir. 1980) (40 years); Thompson v. Clifford, 408 F.2d 154
(D.C. Cir. 1968) (20 years).
177. See supra notes 69 & 151 and accompanying text.
178. Osborn v. American Ass'n of Retired Persons, 660 F.2d 740, 746 (9th Cir. 1981); Sloan,
436 U.S. at 120; see Zuber, 396 U.S. at 192.
179. See supra text accompanying notes 148 & 152-66.
180. 442 U.S. 544, 554 (1979).
181. 436 U.S. 103, 118, 121 (1978).
182. Another strong factor in the Supreme Court's Sloan decision was agency abuse of a stat-
ute. 436 U.S. at 109-10; see also id at 123-25 (Brennan, J., concurring). While the Corps may or
may not have abused its authority, there is certainly strong evidence of Corps bad faith with
regard to § 404. Congressional intent had always been to define navigable waters as broadly as
possible. See supra note 53. Yet the Corps clung to its narrow definition until forced to relinquish
it by court order. Even under court order, the Corps found a way to restrict its effective jurisdic-
tion: nationwide permits for categories of waters. Moreover, the Corps may have evinced an
attitude of bad faith when it issued its May 6, 1975 press release containing an unfavorable and
inflammatory description of the § 404 program. HOUSE COMM. ON PUBLIC WORKS AND TRANS-
PORTATION, FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1977, H.R. REP. No.
139, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. - app. V (1977) (additional views of Reps. Edgar & Myers) ("Federal
permits may be required by the rancher who wants to enlarge his stock pond, or the farmer who
wants to deepen an irrigation ditch or plow a field, or the mountaineer who wants to protect his
land against stream erosion"), reprinted in 4 LEoISLATIVE HISTORY 1977 ACT, supra note 10, at
1195, 1263 app. V. The release was described by two Congressmen as "infamous" and as contain-
ing "very dubious" descriptions of the § 404 program resulting in a grassroots lobbying effort.
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mine that it is 'in conflict with the plain intent of the legislature.' "183 Any
court asked to uphold the Corps' nationwide permits for categories of waters
has just such a duty.
JAMES L. CONNER, II
H.R. REP. No. 139, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. - (1977) (additional views of Reps. Edgar & Myers),
reprinted in 4 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1977 AcT, supra note 10, at 1195, 1248.
183. Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842, 865 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc) (quoting Brother-
hood of R.R. Trainmen v. Akron & Barberton Belt R.R., 385 F.2d 581, 612 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 923 (1968)), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 917 (1973).
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